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BACKGROUND
With the UK preparing to hold a general election on  
12 December, the EU might be tempted to consider that 
since no progress on Brexit is likely to be made until then, 
it can temporarily turn its attention away from the UK 
to focus on other pressing matters. However, given the 
potential of a political shift in the UK, a reversal of their 
position on Brexit and another Scottish independence 
referendum, the EU should not take their eyes off the ball. 
It would be unwise for the EU not to use the coming weeks 
to prepare for the possible outcomes of the elections. 
It would be unwise for the EU not to use the 
coming weeks to prepare for the possible 
outcomes of the elections.
STATE OF PLAY – PREPARING FOR 
DIFFERENT SCENARIOS
In terms of the overall election result, the EU should 
consider three scenarios: a Conservative victory, a Labour 
victory and a hung Parliament.
Scenario 1: Conservative victory
Victory for Prime Minister (PM) Boris Johnson’s 
Conservatives would be the most predictable scenario, at 
least in the short term. Johnson sought the early election 
to win a majority in Parliament and push through the 
Brexit deal he renegotiated with the EU. Success at the 
polls would indicate the public’s approval of his deal 
and give him a strong mandate to leave the EU and “get 
Brexit done” by 31 January 2020.1  However, this pledge 
disregards the fact that reaching a consensus on the 
Withdrawal Agreement is only the first step. The next 
phase, in which the UK’s future relationship with the EU 
will be negotiated, will almost certainly be even more 
difficult as these negotiations will far exceed the previous 
ones in terms of scope and complexity.
Under this scenario, the Withdrawal Agreement would 
very likely be passed by Parliament, and the UK would 
be on track to leave the EU on 31 January 2020, with no 
further extension necessary. Many moderate Conservative 
Members of Parliament’s (MPs) decisions to not stand 
again for election – including prominent figures such as 
former Home Secretary Amber Rudd, Culture Secretary 
Nicky Morgan, former de facto deputy PM David 
Lidington and Ken Clarke, the longest continuously 
sitting MP – points to the possibility of a more right-wing 
parliamentary party that is less likely to frustrate Johnson’s 
plans. Moreover, post-election, the public may have little 
patience for Conservative MPs who refused to support 
Johnson in ‘getting Brexit done’.
This means short-term predictability for the EU. Brussels 
will have achieved its main objectives: ensuring an 
orderly withdrawal, protecting peace in Northern Ireland 
by avoiding a hard border, agreeing on the financial 
settlement and protecting the rights of EU citizens living in 
the UK.
New major challenges ahead
However, in this scenario, new major challenges  
await – namely, concerning the UK’s transition and future 
relationship with the EU. The transition period, which 
effectively preserves the status quo asides from the fact 
that the UK will no longer be represented in the EU’s 
institutions or have voting rights, will begin once the UK 
leaves the EU and is due to last until December 2020. Its 
purpose is to provide both sides the time to negotiate 
their future relationship. According to the Withdrawal 
Agreement, the EU and UK “may, before 1 July 2020, adopt 
a single decision extending the transition period for up to 
1 or 2 years.”2 
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There is little hope that a trade agreement between the 
EU and UK can be reached and ratified between February 
and December 2020, so an extension will probably be 
necessary if the UK is not to fall off the cliff edge and 
end the transition period with no agreement about the 
future relationship in place. The timing of a request 
could be tricky. While the EU will need the UK to decide 
on an extension quickly, Johnson might prefer to delay 
it, to avoid having to admit shortly after winning the 
premiership on a promise to ‘get Brexit done’ that the  
UK would actually need to continue to abide by EU  
rules for longer and pay more into the Union’s budget 
than planned.
Victory for Boris Johnson’s Conservatives 
would be the most predictable scenario, at 
least in the short term.
For the EU, a major concern will be budgetary issues.3  
The planned end of transition coincides with the end of 
the Union’s current budgetary period (2014-20). If the 
transition period is extended, the UK will continue to 
contribute to and participate in EU programmes. This 
would need to be taken into account in the planning of 
the upcoming 2021-27 Multiannual Financial Framework 
(MFF), which the EU hopes to finalise in the first half 
of 2020. An extension request at the end of June could 
therefore leave the EU scrambling to adjust its plans, so it 
is in Brussels’ interest to prepare for this scenario.
The EU should also prepare for the trade negotiations 
and their possible outcomes. The UK is likely to be a 
difficult negotiating partner: it clearly has less leverage 
than the EU but may still struggle to recognise and accept 
this. Its negotiating position will be further weakened 
by three factors. First, the UK lacks experienced trade 
negotiators, as the EU is responsible for reaching trade 
agreements with third countries on behalf of its member 
states. Second, recognising the complexities of the 
negotiations and the trade-offs required, including on the 
level playing field, would mean admitting that Brexiteers’ 
bold statements – such as former International Trade 
Secretary Liam Fox’s claim that a trade deal with the EU 
should be “one of the easiest in human history”4 – were 
misleading. Moreover, accepting the EU’s demands on 
level playing field issues would restrict London’s ability 
to ease regulations after Brexit.5 However, not preparing 
the citizens of the UK for the need to make hard choices 
means that it might be difficult to garner enough support 
for any eventual deal – as is the case with the Withdrawal 
Agreement. Third, the UK will be under intense time 
pressure to agree on a trade deal as quickly as possible.
The negotiations will be further complicated by the 
fact that regardless of how well the deal is negotiated, 
the resulting situation will be worse than the status 
quo. Unlike most trade deals, there will be no gains 
from improved market access or the removal of trade 
barriers; instead, negotiators will have to decide how to 
allocate the costs caused by disintegration.6 Moreover, 
the member states will be defending their individual 
interests, which will complicate even further the 
prospects of striking a deal. 
The EU should also prepare for the possible outcomes 
of the trade negotiations, which are outlined in an EPC 
infographic.7 Under a Conservative government led by 
Johnson, the most likely scenario would be a ‘Canada 
plus’-style free trade agreement that covers goods but 
only has limited provisions on services. This would be 
consistent with the UK’s stated redlines but also come 
at a high cost for the largely service-based economy. For 
example, it is unlikely that the EU would grant the UK’s 
financial sector passporting rights, and thus hinder its 
ability to provide its services across the Union, which 
would affect London in particular. A ‘Canada plus’-style 
arrangement would also raise other issues (e.g. Gibraltar 
would need streamlined border arrangements).
Throughout the process, the EU will have to decide how 
to communicate to its various audiences in Brussels, 
the member states and the UK. If Johnson’s government 
struggles to recognise and outline the trade-offs, should 
the EU correct it publicly? And if yes, then how – by, 
communicating to disappointed Remainers, who may 
have hoped for greater EU intervention throughout 
the Brexit process? How should Brussels address the 
situations in Northern Ireland and Scotland? These 
decision cannot go unanswered.
Scenario 2: Labour victory
A victory by Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party, although 
unlikely, would lead to a very different scenario. Labour’s 
current position is that it would attempt to renegotiate 
the Brexit deal within three months of being elected 
and allow the public to vote on it in another referendum 
within six.
The renegotiated withdrawal agreement would probably 
end up being fairly close to former PM Theresa May’s 
deal, as there was little in the previous Agreement that 
Labour disagreed with in substance. The most significant 
changes would be in the legally non-binding political 
declaration. Labour seeks a closer trading relationship 
with the Union than what is currently envisaged, which 
could translate into a commitment to stay inside the EU’s 
customs union. Beyond this, Labour has provided few 
details of its plans.
It is not clear whether Labour would remain neutral in 
a second referendum or openly advocate for Remain. 
Corbyn has said that this decision would be taken after 
the general election. In any case, the EU would need to 
grant another extension of the Article 50 period.
A difficult Remain vote?
In the event of another referendum, the EU would need 
to prepare for both outcomes. Even though most opinion 
polls indicate a small majority for Remain, the public is 
still deeply split and a second Leave vote is feasible if 
turnout among Remain supporters is low (e.g. if many 
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decide to abstain because they believe that the 2016 
referendum result should be respected).
In any case, a Remain vote would certainly have several 
benefits for the EU. The disruptive Brexit process would 
be stopped, the UK would continue to contribute to the 
EU’s capabilities in security and defence policy, the EU’s 
geopolitical weight would not be diminished and London 
would remain one of the EU’s global financial centres.
However, with the exception of a convincing victory 
with a large margin, the impact of a Remain vote 
would arguably not be universally positive.8 Indeed, 
the UK would probably become a rather difficult and 
unconstructive member state. Given the salience 
and divisiveness of the EU-UK relationship, the UK 
government would struggle to agree to any EU reforms 
that might deepen integration (e.g. the Conference on 
the Future of Europe) or find a way to frame financial 
commitments (e.g. in the context of the MFF). Even 
technical decisions at the EU level could be politicised in 
the UK. The result would be obstruction. This problem 
would be exacerbated by Corbyn’s Eurosceptic leanings, 
assuming he takes the premiership. Moreover, such an 
outcome would not result in a stable equilibrium. Next 
general election, the Conservatives and the Brexit Party 
will likely campaign on the premise of taking the UK out 
of the EU come what may. The EU would have to respond 
to this instability, which would further divert scarce time 
and resources from other pressing matters.
The UK remaining in the EU would also have implications 
for the overall future of European integration. Reaching 
an agreement on any substantial treaty amendments 
would be unimaginable in the foreseeable future. To 
prevent stagnation, integration could be increasingly 
driven by variable coalitions of the willing, as is the 
case with the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation 
(PESCO) whereby 25 member states agreed to pursue 
higher levels of defence cooperation. The centre of power 
would probably still shift to Germany and France as well 
as the euro area, as it is hard to imagine a UK willing 
to reassume its leadership role in the EU and become a 
constructive and strong advocate for the interests of non-
euro countries.
A major question, which tends to be neglected by 
Remainers, is whether the UK would be content with 
remaining in the EU under the current terms, which 
involve accepting the freedom of movement and 
contributing to the MFF. If the UK votes to remain, 
Brussels should prepare to reject attempts to negotiate 
further opt-outs and concessions to avoid setting a 
precedent for other member states that may follow.
Scenario 3: Hung Parliament
Finally, the election could deliver yet another hung 
Parliament, with no majority for any party or stable 
coalition. Such an outcome would prolong the current 
chaos. Whether the Withdrawal Agreement could be 
passed or not would be uncertain. If not, the EU would 
have to grant further extensions of the Article 50  
period – and increasingly strain the patience of the 
member states – to prevent a no-deal outcome on  
31 January. Moreover, the absence of many moderate 
Conservative and Labour figures is likely to lead to a 
more polarised Parliament, which would complicate 
policymaking and the search for common ground further. 
Such a situation would probably be unsustainable in  
the medium term, and another snap election would 
become likely.
A lose-lose situation
None of the three scenarios offers any reason for 
optimism. A Conservative victory would mean short-term 
predictability and an orderly exit but looser EU-UK ties 
in the long term, which would come at a political and 
economic cost for both sides. A Labour victory would 
prolong the current state of uncertainty but offer the 
prospect of a closer relationship in the long term. A hung 
Parliament could mean the worst of both worlds.
None of the three scenarios offers any 
reason for optimism.
The Scottish dimension
The election outcome could also affect the prospects of 
the Scottish independence movement. If the Scottish 
National Party (SNP) offers any parliamentary support 
to a Labour government, it will most likely demand 
the endorsement of a second Scottish independence 
referendum in return through a Section 30 order from 
Downing Street. In fact, regardless of whether the new 
government needs SNP support or not, the political 
pressure on London to endorse a second independence 
vote is likely to grow rapidly.
Though many claimed that the independence question 
would be settled for a generation after 55% of voters 
rejected the prospect in 2014, it remerged when Scotland 
strongly opposed Brexit two years later, with 62% of 
Scots voting to remain in the EU. The outcome of a 
second independence vote would be uncertain. In a 
recent Panelbase survey for The Sunday Times, 50% of 
respondents supported Scottish independence, which is 
the highest value measured in more than seven years.9 
It is conceivable that support will continue to grow, 
depending on how the Brexit process unfolds.
The EU should prepare for the possibility of Scottish 
independence and a membership bid.10 Assuming 
that Scotland holds a second referendum and obtains 
independence in a legally recognised way, this would 
be a positive scenario for the EU. From a symbolic 
perspective, it would reinforce the idea that despite 
Brexit and the success of Eurosceptic parties across the 
continent, EU membership is still valued and aspired by 
many people. While this is also the case in the Western 
Balkans, the Scottish case is unique as the latter already 
knows what membership actually entails and would 
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make its decision on this basis. It would also contribute 
to a positive narrative of the EU, strengthening its soft 
power and improving its international image. Moreover, 
Scotland would be a constructive and committed member 
state that is willing to support more EU integration. 
Reversely, if the EU rejected this aspiring member state 
that shared the values of and had proven its commitment 
to the former, this would reflect poorly on them. Finally, 
Scotland could potentially serve as a bridge to the rest of 
the UK.
The EU should prepare for the possibility of 
Scottish independence and a membership 
bid. Assuming that Scotland holds a second 
referendum and obtains independence in 
a legally recognised way, this would be a 
positive scenario for the EU. 
Scottish EU membership would also have practical 
benefits for the EU. Scottish companies and institutions 
are leading in areas such as renewable energy, academic 
research, computer games, and food and drink. The EU 
would benefit from their inclusion in the Single Market. 
Moreover, Scotland would most likely be a net contributor 
to the EU budget.
Scotland would have to go through the regular EU 
accession process, though it has the advantage of already 
being subject to EU rules. This is not to say that it would 
be without complications, however. Scotland would 
have to accept ‘normal’ membership, with the full rights 
and obligations. It is unlikely that the EU would grant it 
substantial opt-outs or budget rebates. However, there is 
currently no indication that Scotland would seek special 
status or object to these conditions, assuming that the 
SNP is still leading the government.
PROSPECTS
None of the possible outcomes of the upcoming general 
election is ideal for the EU. If the Conservatives win 
a majority, the Withdrawal Agreement will probably 
be passed, providing short-term predictability and 
certainty. However, any longer-term deal would be 
much worse than the status quo. A Labour victory would 
mean the opposite: further short-term uncertainty 
until the new government has renegotiated the deal 
and held a second referendum, but a closer long-term 
relationship (assuming the Leave vote is confirmed). A 
hung Parliament would bring the worst of both worlds. 
The EU should, therefore, use the current respite in the 
Brexit process to prepare itself for all of the possible post-
election scenarios. 
The support the European Policy Centre receives for its 
ongoing operations, or specifically for its publications, does 
not constitute an endorsement of their contents, which reflect 
the views of the authors only. Supporters and partners cannot 
be held responsible for any use that may be made of the 
information contained therein.
EUROPEAN POLICY CENTRE   |   14-16 RUE DU TRÔNE/TROONSTRAAT   |   B-1000 BRUSSELS   |   BELGIUM    |   WWW.EPC.EU
1  Stewart, Heather and Kate Proctor, “Boris Johnson implores MPs to ‘get 
Brexit done’ in crucial Saturday vote”, The Guardian, 19 October 2019.
2  European Commission (2019), Annex to the Proposal for a Council 
Decision amending Decision (EU) 2019/274 on the signing, on behalf of 
the European Union and of the European Atomic Energy Community, of 
the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic 
Energy Community, COM(2019) 880 final, Art.132(1), p.198.
3  Lock, Tobias and Fabian Zuleeg (2018), “Extending the transition period”, 
Brussels: European Policy Centre.
4  Weaver, Matthew, “Liam Fox: EU trade deal after Brexit should be ‘easiest 
in history’ to get”, The Guardian, 20 July 2017.
5  Brunner, Larissa; Fabian Zuleeg; David Baldock; Pablo Ibáñez Colomo, 
Emily Lydgate; Marley Morris; Martin Nesbit; Jacques Pelkmans and 
Vincent Verouden (2019), Ensuring a post-Brexit level playing field, Brussels: 
European Policy Centre.
6  Zuleeg, Fabian (2018a), “The road to nowhere? Prospects for a post-Brexit 
trade deal”, Brussels: European Policy Centre.
7  Zuleeg, Fabian (2017), “Brexit: Towards a deep and comprehensive 
partnership? Infographic”, Brussels: European Policy Centre.
8  Zuleeg, Fabian (2018b), “Welcoming back the prodigal son?”, Brussels: 
European Policy Centre.
9  Allardyce, Jason and Caroline Wheeler, “Support for Scottish 
independence rises to 50%”, The Times, 13 October 2019.
10  Zuleeg, Fabian (2019), “The EU’s Scottish question”, Brussels: European 
Policy Centre.
